Future European Leaders Forum 2020

Participant Policy Proposals

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Executive summary

The Future European Leaders Forum (FELF) is an annual meeting of exceptional young people who are not indifferent to the state of the world they live in and actively seek to make it better. Taking place alongside the Prague European Summit, FELF offers a unique opportunity for such young leaders to discuss their ideas with ministers, diplomats, policy experts and many other relevant stakeholders.

Ideas, which our participants aim to transform into tangible policy proposals. The workshops, guest lectures and panel sessions that make up FELF's programme are designed to help them to that end. For five days, our participants have worked intensely to forge the most innovative yet nonetheless feasible solutions for some of Europe's most pressing issues.

This year's cohort has decided to particularly tackle issues with:

(1) The multi-level governance of environmental matters
(2) A (mental) health union
(3) Digital crime

The first proposal, "**Strengthening the role of regional leaders in the green transition**," brings our attention to the importance of acknowledging regional differentiation in the implementation of the EU's environmental policy. Underscoring the importance of smart specialisation strategies, this idea calls for the empowerment of local authorities, greater support for the most disadvantaged regions, and the development of stronger cross-border interregional networks.

Building on the fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic, the second brief aims to streamline the cooperation on mental health issues across the Union. Their proposal "**Combating the invisible pandemic: A unified strategic mental health program for Europe**" calls on the Commission to develop a Union-wide long-term strategy on mental health, beef up the allocations for the EU4Health programme, and in close cooperation with the youth launch a comprehensive pan-European communication platform.

Lastly, in "**Regulating the cryptocurrency industry to tackle criminal activities**," our participants set out to tackle financial crime connected to cryptocurrencies. Pointing to the laggard regulation of this booming field of finance, the idea is to set up an EU agency that would govern cryptocurrency transactions to pre-empt their potential malicious use.

We invite you to give these youth-driven, uncanny ideas a thoughtful consideration. And should you wish to share your comments with its creators, they will surely appreciate it.

1. Strengthening the role of regional leaders in the green transition

"If the Green Deal for Europe does not take our cities and regions into account, it will fail."[1]

1.1 Introduction

With the EU Green Deal, the European Commission has made sustainability an overriding political and policy priority. The roadmap aims to ensure a continuous improvement in citizens' quality of life without compromising the well-being of future generations. Yet, while global and continental efforts to combat climate change are essential, the burden of implementation rests mostly at the local and regional level.

Local communities and businesses have specific, grassroots knowledge about their regions' needs and strengths. It is important that regions which face similar challenges are connected to share best practices, or even to develop interregional cooperation. Networks to facilitate these interactions do already exist, such as the Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy that consociates thousands of local governments, which voluntarily pledged to meet the 2030 target of 40% greenhouse gas-reduction. However, the existing networks are mostly urban-centred and useful for those actors that already have the necessary political commitment and a local plan to adapt to and benefit from the green transition.

This brief gives several key policy recommendations which aim to ensure that the EU environmental policy takes into account regional differentiation, establishes the required support for green transition measures on local level, and supports international networks between regions. This will allow and empower regions to deliver the change that is necessary to combat climate change.

1.2 Limits of current policies

The Commission's proposal on the Green Deal indicates an intention to work with the Member States and regions to help them put in place territorial transition plans. While crucial, these plans are flawed in three ways:

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[1] Euractiv. (2020). Green Deal: Regionen und Städte leisten ihren Beitrag.
https://www.euractiv.de/section/europakompakt/news/green-deal-reg
ionen-und-staedte-leisten-ihren-beitrag/?_ga=2.88543899.1274418551.1606485369-1884391779.1601898763

1) They focus too much on urban areas. The Commission highlights the role of the Covenant of Mayors in developing urban sustainability strategies. When speaking about peripheral regions, however, the approach is centred along the lines of providing support to these regions, given their 'vulnerable position'. The financial support for these regions is necessary, but not sufficient, as they might lack sufficient administrative capacities to absorb new and structural funds.

2) The four large-scale missions (carbon-pricing, green investment, just transition and industrial strategy) as proposed in the Green Deal are admirable, but the policies that spring from them often do not take into account crucial regional differences, which must, however, be considered in order to ensure an effective sustainable transition.[2]

3) The Green Deal fails to acknowledge that the necessary changes will be more difficult for certain regions, for example coal regions. The Deal also seems to assume a universal popular support for the green transition and thereby fails to acknowledge the need to address the concerns of those whose livelihoods are going to be impacted by the new policy directions.[3]

1.3 Research outcomes

Regions differ greatly in their economic and social characteristics, which in turn influence the likelihood of the success of certain types of paths of green industrial development.[4] In metropolitan regions, where a number of green (low-carbon) and dirty (high-carbon) industries in different stages of development are already present, conditions are generally favourable for the introduction of new industries based on new technologies. However, in regions which specialise in dirty industries, it is more effective to introduce green technologies into existing industries.[5]

Research highlights the importance of smart specialisation: this is not about making the economic structures of regions more specialised per se, but about using regions' existing strengths to identify hidden opportunities and create platforms with which similar regions can build a competitive advantage.[6]

[2] Claeys, G., Tagliapietra, S., & Zachmann, G. (2019). How to make the European Green Deal work. Bruegel Policy Contribution, 13.

[3] Wilczek, M. (2020). Polish miners begin underground strikes to push government to support struggling coal industry. Notes from Poland. https://notesfrompoland.com/2020/09/22/polish-miners-begin-underground-strikes-to-push-government-to-support-struggling-coal-industry/

[4] Grillitsch, M., & Hansen, T. (2019). Green industry development in different types of regions. European Planning Studies, 27(11), 2163-2183.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Balland, P. A., Boschma, R., Crespo, J., & Rigby, D. L. (2019). Smart specialization policy in the European Union:

European regions vary greatly in their branching opportunities, namely in the relatedness density between existing technologies and potential alternative technologies. Regions are better equipped to develop in a sustainable manner if they have more branching opportunities. Branching opportunities are particularly low in regions in the V4 countries, as can be seen on the map below. In these regions in particular, it is important that regions leverage their existing capabilities, as new industries which are flown in from outside are unlikely to gain much of a foothold there. Introducing new technologies sourced from outside into existing industries is more likely to be effective in these regions.[7]

1.4 Recommendations

Different regions have very different paths to the development of sustainable industries and technologies. This leads to several key recommendations:

1. Policies should reflect these regional differences, as only then can local capabilities be used to further the transition.
2. Social support needs to be generated in regions which face the greatest challenges, e.g. through information campaigns.
3. Stronger interregional networks should be established between regions with similar paths to sustainability so they can learn from each other's strategies and develop projects together.

1.4.1 Designing policies that reflect regional differences

a) Existing institutions and organisations such as the European Committee of the Regions and the Covenant of Mayors should be given a stronger voice in the European policy making process in all matters relating to the fight against climate change and the green transition to ensure that European initiatives are effective at regional level.
b) The EU should channel some of its funds directly to the local and regional level under the green transition umbrella, which has been previously demanded in an open letter by over 50 mayors,[8] indicating a political will.
c) Policies should be based on local capabilities and regions' specific industrial characteristics.

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relatedness, knowledge complexity and regional diversification. Regional Studies, 53(9), 1252-1268.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Eurocities (2020). Re: EU 2030 Green House Gas emissions target/ EU Nationally Determined Contribution. Available from: https://eurocities.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Eurocities-Open-Letter-FINAL.pdf

i.   In metropolitan regions, policies should focus on the development of new technologies and industries, primarily by facilitating university-industry relations. European funding should support the cooperation between universities, schools and local businesses, as well as joint research and work-placement projects, in order to create an innovative regional ecosystem.

ii.   In peripheral regions without a clear specialisation, the development of the capabilities of niche actors in existing green industries should be stimulated through specialised training programmes and support for attracting highly skilled labour, which should be supported by the interregional networks described above.

iii.   In regions which currently specialise in dirty industries, the introduction of green technologies into existing industries should be stimulated.

iv.   In regions which currently specialise in green industries, growth and diversification of these industries should be encouraged through supporting the internationalisation of these industries and helping the established industries to accumulate the knowledge required to diversify.

1.4.2 Generating social support

a)   Language referring to the 'vulnerability' of regions which face challenging transitions should be replaced by language which refers to these regions as the leaders of the transition.

b)   The EU and national governments should also invest in wider information campaigns, while working together with local groups with grassroots knowledge, such as churches and sports teams.

c)   Education is an important driver of change. Local environmental organisations should be provided with possibilities to explain the challenges connected to climate change.

1.4.3 Creating effective interregional networks

a)   Comprehensive teaming and twinning strategies between regions should be developed to allow for efficient policy implementation. These strategies should promote cooperation in pioneering transitioning post-industrial regions and stimulate East-West cooperation.

b)   Central administrations should cooperate and share the burden of fund allocation and project investment with the most disadvantaged regions and cities that struggle with

implementation of climate policies and a smooth transition and promote the territorial element.[9]

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[9] European Parliament (2020). Regulation (EU), 2020/558 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2020 Amending Regulations (EU) No 1301/2013 and (EU) No 1303/2013.

2. Combating the invisible pandemic: A unified strategic mental health program for Europe

2.1 Introduction

The following proposal tackles an unheeded domain in the European Health Union - mental health. The current pandemic and its side-effects not only have a sizable impact on the mental health of EU citizens but have also demonstrated how young people are more affected by mental health problems related to the pandemic.[10] Considering that one out of three EU citizens is under 30 years of age,[11] the importance of tackling this aspect resides in the long-term social and economic benefits as well as in easing the lives of more than 100 million young European citizens.

The COVID-19 crisis has uncovered that the Member States lack unity in coordinating solutions to cross-border health issues. Among other things, the proposal of the European Health Union shows a reinforced conviction that a joint response to public health problems is more efficient and impactful.

It is imperative to make use of this growing political interest and of the newly allocated resources to increase the relevance of the European Health Union by adding a European mental health program. To help facilitate and coordinate actions between different actors, we also suggest a thorough stakeholder mapping and a creation of a publicly accessible platform for communication with and between the involved initiatives. The conclusion defines the priorities for the following unified action on mental health in Europe.

2.2 Benefits of targeting mental health problems

Approximately every fourth EU citizen is affected by depression or anxiety every year.[12] The costs that arise as a consequence of mental health problems are estimated to be over 4% of GDP across the EU Member States (more than EUR 600 billion).[13] This amount does not only refer to direct costs of treatment and social security, as 40% of this budget is the estimated indirect impact on the labour market of unemployment and the decreased productivity

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[10] The hidden health crisis: the dramatic impact of COVID-19 on young people's mental health
[11] Eurostat
[12] Mental health - Depression in Europe: facts and figures
[13] Health at a Glance: Europe 2018

identified in individuals with mental health issues.[14] Consequently, investing in mental health prevention will lead not only to social benefits, but also to cost savings and an increase in economic welfare.

According to a number of studies, young adults (18-29 years old) as well as children suffered higher levels of distress as opposed to other age groups during the COVID-19 pandemic, mainly due to a lack of socialization, disruptions in their education and uncertainty about the future.[15] As the European Union strives to be more inclusive and let the voices of young people be heard and respected, supporting the health and well-being of the European youth must be considered a priority and an investment into the future.

2.3 The previous EU initiatives to build upon

Mental health is not an unfamiliar topic to the European agenda. Already in 2005, the Green Paper for Mental Health paved the way towards a strategy on mental health for the European Union's population. Only in 2013, however, the EU framework on mental health laid down the path for the Joint Action on Mental Health and Well-Being (2013-2018).[16]

The EU framework on mental health and well-being succeeded in bringing a system for mental health prevention and early intervention programs to be implemented at European level. It also ensured the transition to comprehensive mental health treatment and quality care for EU citizens, and furthermore the strengthening of knowledge, evidence and best practice sharing in the field of mental health.[17]

Nevertheless, the lack of coordination and of a unified approach impede us in building societies with increased resilience in terms of mental health.

2.3.1 Addressing the lack of coordination

The current state of affairs has shown that isolated policies and regulations in separate EU Member States are not sufficient for tackling the problem. We observe discrepancies in terms of implementation and availability of attitudes towards and support of mental health, which

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[14] Ibid.
[15] WHO Adolescent Health 2020; Promoting mental health in Europe: Why and how? (A 2018 OECD study on mental health in the EU); The impact of COVID-19 and lockdown on the mental health of children and adolescents: A narrative review with recommendations
[16] European Commission - Mental Health
[17] European Commission - Mental Health; Mental Health and Wellbeing; EU-Compass for Action on Mental Health and Well-being | Public Health

create unnecessary inequalities in the well-being of the EU citizens.

Article 152 of the EC Treaty (Maastricht) stipulates that "a high level of human health protection shall be ensured in the definition and implementation of all Community policies and activities." The Treaty establishes a legal base for the EU to complement national policies in areas where Member States fail to provide adequate care, including mental health.

Concerning the disharmony of non-state actors, we firstly lack a clear public European database of and for actors involved in the fight for improved mental health. The EU needs to implement an efficient programme whose first task will be to limit the impact of the pandemic on mental health and simultaneously form a network of involved parties ensuring a long-term coordination of efforts.

2.3.2 A unified approach to mental health

The third EU Health Programme finishing in 2020 has led to a funding and tenders call for projects in mental health. If the EU provides more support for and harmonisation of the participating initiatives, these funds might yet bring positive results for societies affected by the collateral effects of the COVID19 pandemic.

In light of the recent pandemic, the EU reacted by proposing a new and enhanced collaboration in the sphere of public health by building the European Health Union.[18] The programme certainly looks promising in the sense that it could provide a more efficient and unified cooperation in the domain of health, especially in tackling cross-border threats, with the EU4Health Programme planning a budget allocation of 9.4 billion euro to it. We need to seize this opportunity to add mental health permanently into the equation through this new initiative.

Thus, an investment into mental health for the whole society of the EU within the EU4Health Program should be considered in a separate section under Annex I Art (f) of the EU Commission's Proposal, as opposed to being only briefly mentioned and aimed at vaguely defined "vulnerable groups". A dedicated section would certainly promote the topic as a stand-alone issue to invest in, so that we could strengthen European society's resilience in mental health.

In recent years, the implementation of initiatives tackling not only infectious but also non-communicable diseases such as the 'EU Can Beat Cancer Plan' has shown how cross-border cooperation, exchange and financing at EU level, prove to be the most efficient way to tackle

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[18] Building a European Health Union: Stronger crisis preparedness and response for Europe

health challenges. Nonetheless, even though the EU documents mention mental health in this group, they do not particularly develop a roadmap on how the European Union plans to tackle this substantial area of public health.

Mental health has also been an omitted factor in the EU Development Aid. The attention to it has been increasing since 2007 but mental health measures still tackle only particular issues instead of focusing on systematic improvements in the mental health systems of individual countries.[19] The same applies to the EU Neighbourhood Policy. In fact, more investment and efficiency in tackling mental health issues might serve as measures encouraging support for the EU as they are directly felt by the citizens, as opposed to focusing on economic reforms. Moreover, mental health support would also be a facilitator of de-radicalisation and peace.

2.4 Recommendations

In light of the above-mentioned reasons, to meet the EU's commitment to mental health protection as stated in the TFEU art. 168, and to strengthen the common mental health action for both the immediate present and the years to come, we, the Future European Leaders, urge the EU policy makers to:

1) Build up the mental health resilience of the European society through a long-term strategic program on mental health (MHEU) as part of the European Health Union, which would facilitate cooperation between the member states in areas of research, knowledge exchange and funding; and create a special task force within its framework to be charged with minimizing the impact of the pandemic's collateral effects on mental health.
2) Acknowledge the commitment to invest into mental health by extending and clearly dedicating at least 10% of the EU4Health program investment into actions for the promotion and protection of mental health for all.
3) Coordinate and harmonize efforts related to mental health action through the creation of a unified front of actors through a thorough communication strategy and stakeholder mapping; design a publicly accessible platform containing a database of European, national and regional initiatives involved in the field, and include relevant applications and other projects, as well as the information about the common action, goals and funding in it; and introduce a bi-annual mental health summit as a part of this platform to facilitate interaction and knowledge-sharing between stakeholders and public health officials, and monitor progress in the domain.

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[19] LHGP Report

4) Involve the young generation when designing the strategic mental health program by inviting youth-led initiatives to the decision-making process through an open call and mobilising volunteers from already established networks.

2.5 Going further and beyond

While implementing these policies, the existing discrepancies among Member States in approaching mental health as well as divergences in definitions and understandings of the issue need to be taken into consideration.

However, these are the factors the decision-makers should attempt to harmonize by supporting and facilitating not only the best practices, but also supportive attitudes and respect towards the mental health and well-being of all EU citizens. It is necessary to promote the substantial positive value of mental health and cost-effectiveness while incentivizing large structural and societal changes and reforming the draining work culture. Such changes need to be applied especially in the Central and Eastern EU Member States, where the usual number of hours at work far exceeds the EU average, and thus worsens employees' work-life balance and causes further discrepancies across the Union.[20]

It is also crucial to together find means to reduce prices of therapy, especially for young people and students, who form the group most susceptible to suffering from mental health disorders in a public health crisis, but also are the least likely to visit a mental health specialist. A discussion far beyond the scope of this paper is needed to find plausible solutions to such problems, but we are ready to engage in such a discussion.

Finally, while focusing on the mental health care in its midst, the European Union cannot forget about incorporating mental health into its development aid programs as well as extending the Health Union towards its neighbourhood. The support of health and well-being may reinforce the EU's transformative power and contribute to the development of a peaceful and stable society.

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[20] Eurostat Statistics 2019

2.6 Appendix

The EU mental health policy pathway from 2005 until 2018

Year	Initiative	Summary
2005	**Green Paper for Mental Health – "Improving Mental Health of the population. Towards a strategy on mental health for the European Union"**	Advocates for: • promoting mental health and addressing mental illness through preventive action; • promoting the social inclusion of mentally ill or disabled people and protecting their fundamental rights and dignity; • developing an interface between policy and research on mental health; • and a consultation process for the development of an EU strategy on mental health.
2008-11	**The European Pact for Mental Health and Well-being**	Five priority areas: 1) Prevention of Depression and Suicide 2) Mental Health in Youth and Education 3) Mental Health in Workplace Settings 4) Mental Health of Older People 5) Combating Stigma and Social Exclusion. The Pact should facilitate the monitoring of trends and activities in Member States and among stakeholders, and help deliver recommendations for action. Invites Member States and the Commission to: • establish a mechanism for the exchange of information; • work together to identify good practices and success factors in policy; • communicate the results of such work through a series of conferences on the Pact's priority themes over the coming years.

2011	Adopted Council Conclusions – "The European Pact for Mental Health and Well-being: Results and Future Actions"	Recalls: • the Commission's 2005 Green Paper and the 2008 EU high-level conference 'establishing the European Pact for Mental Health and Well-Being'. Invites Member States to: • make mental health and well-being a priority of their health policies and to develop strategies in this respect; • make best use of the possibilities offered by the Structural Funds in the field of mental health. Invites Member States and the Commission to: • continue the cooperation as a follow-up to the European Pact for Mental Health and Well-being; • set up a Joint Action on Mental Health and Well-being; • and further develop the European Compass for Action on Mental Health and Well-being.
2013	The EU framework on mental health	• Develops mental health promotion and prevention and early intervention programmes. • Ensures the transition to comprehensive mental health treatment and quality care. • Strengthens knowledge, evidence, and best practice sharing in the field of mental health.
2013-16	The Joint Action on Mental Health and Well-being	Recommendations for: • tackling depression and suicide; • action for mainstreaming e-mental health; • action for improved the design and dissemination.

2015-18	The EU Compass for Action on Mental Health and Well-being	Builds on the work of the Joint Action.
		Seven priority areas:
		1) preventing depression and promoting resilience
		2) providing better access to mental health services
		3) providing community-based mental health services
		4) preventing suicide
		5) mental health at work
		6) mental health in schools
		7) developing integrated governance approaches.

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3. Regulating the cryptocurrency industry to tackle criminal activities

3.1 Introduction

Cryptocurrency transactions foster cross-border financial crimes such as money laundering and financing of terrorism. This sphere, however, due to its recentness, is not yet sufficiently covered by European regulation. In the age of digitalization, the Union's authorities should keep up with the new technologies and prevent them from hurting the economy. The current European policy on regulating crypto transactions must be amended and expanded to treat cryptocurrency exchanges like other financial institutions and set up a single institution within the EU for the coordination of cryptocurrency regulations.

Each year, around 200 billion EUR is laundered within Europe,[21] which is detrimental to the European economy. Although there are multiple anti-money laundering (AML) mechanisms and institutions in place to deal with the issue, cryptocurrency transactions are a sphere so new and unexplored that it has yet to be sufficiently secured by the EU. What is even more worrying is the fact that the scale of the problem rises very quickly – taking Bitcoin as an example, the value of money coming from illegal Blockchain transactions has almost tripled from 2018 to 2019. Statistics say that approximately 25 % of Bitcoin users and 50 % of all Bitcoin transactions are associated with illegal activity.[22] But Bitcoin is not the only cryptocurrency available anymore, with many others emerging all the time. The fact that they are anonymous and very difficult to trace or attribute makes cryptocurrencies the perfect tool for moving and laundering illicitly earned money. In the sphere of cyber criminality, 97 % of ransomware attacks and 66 % of dark web vendors request payment in cryptocurrency.[23]

With digital sovereignty being one of the key European priorities, the Union must adapt its current legal, regulatory and financial instruments in order to be able to act independently in a world where new technologies influence EU citizens' lives more and more - especially in order to more effectively battle transnational crime.

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[21] Europol (2017): From Suspicion to Action - Converting Financial Intelligence into Greater Operational Impact. Available at: https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/suspicion-to-action-converting-financial-intelligence-greater-operational-impact

[22] Foley, Sean and Karlsen, Jonathan R. and Putnins, Talis J. (2018): Sex, Drugs, and Bitcoin: How Much Illegal Activity Is Financed through Cryptocurrencies?. Review of Financial Studies, Forthcoming, Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3102645 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3102645

[23] Helpnet Security (2020): Cryptocurrency Crime Losses More Than Double to $4.5 Billion in 2019. Available at: https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2020/02/13/cryptocurrency-crime-losses/

The pandemic crisis has added urgency to solving these structural economic problems and we should capitalize on this unique opportunity to garner public momentum in order to address these issues.

3.2 Current Measures: Missing the Target

There are two main problems with the current EU-wide cryptocurrency framework. First, although a cryptocurrency-focused regulation is on its way, and should be introduced by 2024,[24] it focuses predominantly on the financial side of the issue, its primary goal being remedying the possible financial impact of the existence of cryptocurrencies.

Cryptocurrencies were only recently incorporated into the anti-money laundering legislation by way of the AMLD V (the Anti-Money Laundering Directive). However, it is still unclear whether, for example, crypto exchanges fall under the definition of financial institutions, thus having duties like due diligence and KYC (Know Your Customer) levelled onto them. Furthermore, the AMLD V's transposition remains unsatisfactory (as of the deadline of 10 Jan 2020, 8 Member States have still not transposed it fully into their own national legal systems)[25].

The current setup does not work, and it will only get less feasible with passing years and the ongoing integration of the Union. The AML framework has already been found to be inefficient, with the uneven level of competences across national FIUs (bodies tasked with oversight and investigation of money laundering in individual Member States) and the slowness being especially criticized.[26] The whole anti-money laundering and terrorism financing regime is in "urgent need of a more harmonized set of sanctions at EU level."[27]

Cryptocurrencies operate in a highly internationalized and borderless domain. Therefore, a framework on the level of the EU would help to overcome all of the aforementioned shortcomings.

3.3 Upgrading to an EU-Level: Recommendations

Include money laundering in combination with cryptocurrencies in the Czech EU Council

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[24] Kelms Kevin (2020): EU to Launch Comprehensive Crypto Regulation by 2024: Report. Available at: https://news.bitcoin.com/eu-cryptocurrency-regulation-2024/
[25] Per the European Commission transposition status website.
[26] EU Commission (2019): Fight against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing: Commission Assesses Risks and Calls for Better Implementation of the Rules. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_4452
[27] Eero Heinäluoma (2020): How Europe Can Fight Money Laundering. The Parliament Magazine. Available at: https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/news/article/how-europe-can-fight-money-laundering

presidency in 2022 by:

1) Pushing for full implementation of the AMLD IV and AMLD V by all Member States by the end of 2022, with a particular focus on making the following changes:
   a) a requirement for all crypto exchanges operating on the territory of the EU to be registered with a competent national authority;
   b) an obligation for crypto exchanges to collect specific information for a given period of time (KYC) - incl. IP addresses, personal IDs, etc.
   c) setting a limit on the amount of cryptocurrency that can be exchanged (topped-up) without proving the origin of the funds, such as in the case of depositing a large amount of money in a bank;
   d) expanding due diligence processes of exchange platforms to include over-the-counter third parties to prevent them from severing the link between criminals and the exchange, thus limiting the amount of laundering that can be discovered;
   e) setting up a single institution within the EU for coordination of the cryptocurrency regulations;
   f) the EU should set a standard for licensing of cryptocurrency exchanges at national level;
   g) every state should be obliged to designate one national authority at whose office all of the crypto exchanges would be registered;
   h) states should have a right to shut a cryptocurrency exchange down in case it does not follow regulations of the EU standard.

2) Calling for the following to be included in the drafted cryptocurrency regulation:
   a) A harmonization of licencing and registration requirements for cryptocurrency exchanges across the EU;
   b) The creation of an EU-level Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU);
   c) Precautionary measures for cryptocurrency exchanges operating from third countries.

3) Establishing a review mechanism under the EBSI (European Blockchain Services Infrastructure) to keep track of the implementation of the legislation and gather input from the industry.

4) Organizing training activities in order to develop skills and knowledge among EU law enforcement agencies.

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About FELF

To inspire, connect, and empower.

The Future European Leaders Forum (FELF) creates space for a meaningful, open and inspiring debate between the engaged youth and relevant stakeholders. Every year, an opportunity to have a tangible policy impact is given to 30 exceptional future leaders between the age of 21 and 30 with diverse professional and academic background. FELF summons individuals with a proven track record as opinion leaders and global shapers. They all come from diverse backgrounds amongst which are politics, science, business, media, the arts, and civil society.

These up-and-coming leaders meet decision makers, experts and other stakeholders to find innovative solutions for a wide range of the most pressing Europe-wide issues. Networking is one of the key strengths of FELF. Not only do our participants meet like-minded future change makers, encounter current policy shapers and learn from esteemed experts during the many workshops, simulations, and teambuilding activities that are prepared for them.

What makes FELF truly unique is its connection to the Prague European Summit (PES). Every year, FELF takes place alongside this C-level conference which draws to Prague many influential policymakers, distinguished academics and other high-profile stakeholders. FELF participants thus have an unparalleled opportunity to ask ministers, diplomats, journalists, professors and many others direct questions during PES panel discussions. What is more, they can follow-up on their enquiries during lunchbreaks and a plethora of networking events.

Such interactions empower our participants both professionally and personally. But the networking scope also follows a different aim. FELF's ultimate goal is to produce tangible and implementable policy proposals. Connected to relevant stakeholders, our participants can be inspired by the feedback on their ideas and shape them accordingly.

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